The Presumed Consensus: When Scholarly Agreement Becomes a Substitute for Evidence
There is an argument that comes up frequently in discussions about the Bible, Christianity, and ancient history. Someone makes a claim, another person challenges it, and the response is that the overwhelming majority of scholars agree with the original position. Sometimes we are told there is a scholarly consensus, as though this should settle the discussion.
But how do we know that such a consensus actually exists?
Claims about what most scholars believe are common enough, yet the evidence behind them is not always presented. Some of the conclusions being defended may be very well supported. Still, a statement about scholarly agreement is itself a factual claim. It tells us something about the opinions of a particular group of people, and we should be able to examine the basis for it. Even when that agreement is genuine, another question remains: what does it establish about the historical problem under discussion?
Expert judgment gives us a reasonable starting point, especially when we lack the training to assess every manuscript, linguistic argument, or historical source ourselves. But before assigning weight to a supposed consensus, we need to know who is being counted, what they actually agree about, and how confidently that agreement can be described.
What Do We Actually Mean by Consensus?
The term consensus is not always used consistently. Sometimes it describes overwhelming agreement among specialists. Sometimes it means the dominant interpretation within a discipline, or simply the position commonly taught in introductory literature. Those descriptions can refer to quite different situations.
If sixty percent of specialists accept an interpretation, thirty percent reject it, and ten percent are uncertain, we might reasonably call it the majority position. An overwhelming consensus suggests something considerably stronger. We also have to identify the relevant specialists. Are we discussing New Testament scholars generally, experts on the Pauline letters, historians of early Christianity, or scholars working within a particular critical tradition? A statement about one group should not quietly become a statement about them all.
This becomes especially difficult when a subject crosses disciplines. Josephus is studied by historians of ancient Judaism, classicists, Roman historians, and New Testament scholars, sometimes with different questions and assumptions. A specialist's informed assessment of the prevailing view is worth taking seriously, but it is different from a representative measurement of scholarly opinion. A textbook convention may be useful, too, without telling us how every specialist would answer a more precise question.
Not every passing reference to a widely held view demands a formal survey. Scholars can have good reasons to describe the state of their fields from long experience. But the more emphatic the claim, and the more heavily an argument depends upon it, the more reasonable it becomes to ask for its basis. An unsupported assertion of consensus might be correct. We simply cannot establish that from the assertion itself.
Colossians: What Happens When We Actually Ask Scholars?
Colossians is regularly listed among the six disputed letters attributed to Paul. The letter names Paul and Timothy at the beginning, yet scholars have questioned its authorship because of differences in vocabulary, style, theology, and its relationship to the other Pauline writings. Others have defended its Pauline origin, sometimes allowing for a secretary or another collaborator to have played a substantial role. Calling the letter disputed is reasonable enough. But the label leaves a fairly basic question unanswered: how many scholars actually reject Pauline authorship, and what do they mean by it?
In September 2011, Paul Foster put the authorship question to an audience at the British New Testament Conference in Nottingham. Of the 109 people who answered about Colossians, 56 (51.4 percent) accepted Pauline authorship, 17 (15.6 percent) rejected it, and 36 (33.0 percent) were unsure. Those accepting it outnumbered those rejecting it by more than three to one. [1]
Foster did not pretend that this was a census of New Testament scholarship. He estimated that roughly seventy percent of the conference audience returned a form, participation was voluntary, and the responses came from one event with a strong British representation. He also pointed out something that can be missed when the Pauline letters are divided into seven undisputed and six disputed writings. Scholars sometimes use that classification to describe the standard position even when they personally accept one or more of the additional letters as genuine. [1] It is a useful way to introduce the debate, but it does not necessarily tell us what an individual scholar believes. Foster’s figures describe one conference, and no more. Anyone claiming that Pauline authorship of Colossians is overwhelmingly rejected still needs evidence for that broader statement.
In 2013, Nijay K. Gupta approached the issue through published scholarship, examining how eight influential scholars argued about the authorship of Colossians. He described Pauline scholarship, particularly over the preceding century, as almost evenly divided on the question. His interest went beyond counting supporters. Scholars assigned different weight to matters such as vocabulary and style, theological development, and assumptions about what authorship involved in the ancient world. Gupta found that several methodological questions remained unresolved and urged caution in reaching confident conclusions. [2] This was an examination of eight scholars’ arguments rather than a representative survey, but it gives us a better sense of why the disagreement has persisted.
In a survey conducted in late 2024 and discussed in a 2026 article, Zen Hess and Bruce W. Longenecker asked scholars how involved Paul was in composing each letter. Among the 153 people who answered about Colossians, 51.0 percent chose “significantly involved,” 17.7 percent “somewhat involved,” 22.9 percent “not involved,” and 8.5 percent “unsure.” [3] The respondents had experience teaching or publishing on Paul, although Hess and Longenecker warned that they could not establish how well this group represented Pauline scholarship worldwide. Their question also allowed respondents to consider forms of Pauline involvement that a simple answer about whether Paul wrote the letter might leave unexplained.
James D. G. Dunn’s treatment of Colossians offers a good example. He considered the possibility that Timothy composed the letter at Paul’s direction and with his approval. [1] A scholar persuaded by that proposal could still regard Colossians as Pauline, even if Timothy did much of the actual writing. That is a very different account of its origin from one in which someone wrote the letter in Paul’s name after his death. Hess and Longenecker themselves acknowledged that work involving a secretary might fall into either “significantly” or “somewhat” involved, depending on how respondents understood those categories. [3] Those differences can disappear surprisingly quickly when the entire authorship debate is summarized as a vote on whether Paul wrote the letter.
Josephus and the Problem of an Ambiguous Consensus
The Testimonium Flavianum, the passage about Jesus in Book 18 of Josephus's Jewish Antiquities, presents a different difficulty. Josephus wrote the Antiquities around 93–94 AD, but the passage as transmitted contains language that has long raised questions about Christian alteration.
At least three broad positions need to be distinguished. Some scholars argue that Christians inserted the entire passage. Others think Josephus wrote an original notice about Jesus that was subsequently modified by Christian copyists. Still others defend the substantial or complete authenticity of the received text. These positions involve different reconstructions of the manuscript's history, even when popular discussions group them under the general heading of whether the passage is a "forgery."
Chrissy M. E. Hansen's 2024 study challenged the independence of proposed witnesses to the passage, arguing that the surviving forms ultimately depend upon Eusebius, either directly or through intermediaries. Hansen also acknowledged that recent studies had largely favored partial authenticity. [4] Those are separate observations: one concerns Hansen's analysis of the textual witnesses; the other describes a tendency in recent scholarship that Hansen disputes on evidential grounds.
T. C. Schmidt's 2025 monograph, Josephus and Jesus, takes a substantially different position. Schmidt argues for the passage's authenticity using linguistic and literary analysis together with evidence from its later reception, and challenges parts of the case against its authenticity. [5] His proposals can be questioned, as can Hansen's, but the disagreement turns upon identifiable historical and textual arguments. The relative strength of those arguments cannot be determined by labeling either side the consensus.
A claim that many scholars think Christians altered the passage leaves open how much they altered and whether Josephus mentioned Jesus at all. That is a considerable difference in the historical conclusion. When someone invokes agreement about Josephus, the proposition being agreed upon needs to be stated precisely.
When a Majority Becomes an Overwhelming Consensus
Descriptions of scholarly opinion can grow stronger as they pass from specialist writing into popular discussion. A position initially described as widely held becomes the majority view, and then, perhaps, an overwhelming consensus. It is easy to see how this could happen without anyone setting out to mislead. Specialists summarize complex disputes, and brief explanations often discard qualifications that were clear in the original setting.
But the words make different claims. The most common interpretation need not have an absolute majority; a majority need not be overwhelming; and agreement about a limited proposition cannot be extended to a broader one without further evidence. The Colossians figures show why strength and scope should not be assumed. The Josephus debate shows how the very subject of the claimed agreement can change in retelling.
The problem becomes more serious when a claim about consensus is asked to carry the argument on its own. A description of the field may help readers locate an interpretation within scholarship. It cannot tell them whether the arguments for that interpretation are sound until they also know something about those arguments.
Are We Counting Scholars or Independent Conclusions?
Another difficulty is how independently scholars reach their judgments. Suppose a hundred specialists accept an interpretation of an ancient text. Their agreement may be significant, but a hundred endorsements do not necessarily represent a hundred separate examinations of every relevant manuscript or historical claim. Many scholars have learned from the same foundational studies, worked within the same academic traditions, and relied upon evidence assembled by earlier researchers.
There is nothing improper about this. Scholarship is cumulative, and even specialists cannot personally inspect everything on which their work depends. Indeed, a well-established conclusion may be so thoroughly argued that other scholars have good reason to use it without reconstructing the entire case. The question is how much evidential weight we should assign to the agreement itself, particularly when the same interpretation is being repeated from a common source.
Foster's observation about the conventional seven-letter Pauline corpus illustrates one part of the problem. The framework circulates widely even among scholars who accept more than seven letters as Pauline. [1] Its repetition shows that it has become a standard way of introducing the subject; it does not always reveal where individual scholars place the boundaries of authenticity.
We should therefore ask which arguments sustain the agreement and whether alternative evidence has been seriously considered. This is not a demand for every historian to begin from scratch. It is recognition that the circulation of a conclusion and the reasons supporting it are related questions. A consensus becomes more informative when we understand both.
When Agreement Becomes an Argument
There are excellent reasons to rely upon specialists. Nobody can personally master every ancient language, textual tradition, archaeological problem, or philosophical dispute. John Hardwig's work on epistemic dependence examines why rational inquiry so often rests upon other people's knowledge and labor. Alvin Goldman considers how nonspecialists might judge competing experts by examining their arguments, reliability, and the assessments of other qualified specialists. [6] [7]
For someone new to a subject, the prevailing specialist view can be a sensible starting point. It may even be the most responsible position to hold provisionally. But imagine someone offers a detailed objection involving the language of Colossians or the transmission of Josephus. Responding only that most scholars disagree tells us where the objection stands in relation to prevailing opinion. It tells us little about what is wrong with the objection itself.
Of course, some objections have been answered repeatedly, and no scholar owes a fresh response to every claim that appears online. Directing a reader to the studies that deal with an objection may be entirely sufficient. The important thing is that the scholarship provides reasons that can be examined. Otherwise, an appeal to consensus risks becoming a way to end a discussion at the very point where its evidence needs attention.
Why Disagreement Still Matters
Disagreement can serve an intellectual purpose even when most specialists have good reasons to favor one conclusion. A minority interpretation may preserve neglected evidence, expose an assumption, or require the prevailing account to explain a difficult source more fully. Miriam Solomon's work on social empiricism is relevant because it examines how communities of inquiry make use of different approaches and lines of investigation. [8]
None of this makes a dissenting scholar more likely to be correct. There are minority positions resting on weak evidence, arguments that have been thoroughly answered, and objections that survive mainly because they continue to be repeated. Dissent deserves examination according to the quality of its reasoning, just as a consensus deserves weight according to the quality and breadth of the scholarship supporting it.
When a prevailing interpretation survives serious criticism, we understand better why specialists favor it. When criticism reveals a mistake, the field has a reason to change. Both possibilities depend on the willingness to engage an argument beyond counting its supporters.
The Same Standard Must Apply to Everyone
There is an obvious temptation to be selective about all this. Someone might demand a representative survey before accepting that most scholars reject Pauline authorship, then casually assert that most scholars accept it. Or object to describing Josephus's passage as a forgery while claiming that virtually every scholar defends its authenticity.
Neither approach works. A claim about scholarly agreement requires appropriate support whether it favors our preferred interpretation or challenges it. We must also be willing to recognize genuine expertise when it points somewhere we would rather not go. The existence of a minority view, even a serious one, does not automatically establish that the prevailing position has collapsed.
That leaves room for skepticism without turning skepticism itself into a position we are determined to defend. We can acknowledge that a consensus exists, question exaggerated descriptions of it, and still evaluate the evidence that led scholars to their conclusions.
Conclusion: A Consensus Is a Claim, Not a Conversation Stopper
Scholarly agreement deserves serious consideration. If most qualified specialists favor an interpretation, their judgment gives us a reason to take that interpretation seriously, especially when the subject lies outside our expertise. Yet the claim that an overwhelming majority agrees on a particular question should be one we can examine, both in its strength and in its precise meaning.
Colossians and the Testimonium Flavianum offer useful cautions. A small conference survey cannot speak for an entire discipline, and agreement that a text underwent some Christian alteration cannot settle whether it originated with Josephus. Neither example decides the underlying historical dispute. Both remind us how much can be obscured when a complicated scholarly discussion is reduced to a declaration of consensus.
I am perfectly willing to give scholarly agreement its due. But if someone offers a serious challenge, I want to know which part of the evidence fails, which arguments answer it, and whether the claimed consensus has been accurately described in the first place. That seems a reasonable expectation of scholarship, whatever conclusion we happen to favor.
References
[1] Foster, Paul. “Who Wrote 2 Thessalonians? A Fresh Look at an Old Problem.” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 35, no. 2 (2012): 150–175. https://doi.org/10.1177/0142064X12462654.
[2] Gupta, Nijay K. “What Is in a Name? The Hermeneutics of Authorship Analysis Concerning Colossians.” Currents in Biblical Research 11, no. 2 (2013): 196–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476993X12439885.
[3] Hess, Zen, and Bruce W. Longenecker. “Through a Glass Darkly: Pedagogical Potentials in the 2024 Survey of Pauline Studies.” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 49, no. 1 (2026): 32–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0142064X261465067.
[4] Hansen, Chrissy M. E. “Reception of the Testimonium Flavianum: An Evaluation of the Independent Witnesses to Josephus’ Testimonium Flavianum.” New England Classical Journal 51, no. 2 (2024): 50–75. https://doi.org/10.52284/NECJ.51.2.article.hansen.
[5] Schmidt, T. C. Josephus and Jesus: New Evidence for the One Called Christ. Oxford University Press, 2025.
[6] Hardwig, John. “Epistemic Dependence.” The Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 7 (1985): 335–349. https://doi.org/10.2307/2026523.
[7] Goldman, Alvin I. “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 1 (2001): 85–110. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x.
[8] Solomon, Miriam. Social Empiricism. MIT Press, 2001.