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What Did Leviticus Actually Prohibit?

Whenever homosexuality comes up in Christian discussions, it usually doesn’t take long before someone quotes Leviticus. The passages are familiar enough. Leviticus 18:22 prohibits lying with a male as with a woman, while Leviticus 20:13 repeats the prohibition and prescribes death for both participants. For many Christians, that seems to settle the issue. Others argue that the verses originally concerned rape, pederasty, sexual exploitation, or some other specific practice rather than consensual intercourse between men.

There is a temptation on both sides to settle the question before examining the Hebrew. The familiar English translation can make the prohibition seem simpler than it is, while a proposed restriction to exploitation or sexual violence still needs evidence to support it. We have to begin with the wording, consider the world in which these laws developed, and then look at how Jewish interpreters understood them. That last step requires some care. Later Jewish writers might preserve an older understanding, but they could also bring new assumptions about sexuality and religious practice to the passages they inherited.

What Does the Hebrew Say?

Leviticus 18:22 is usually translated as, “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination.” Leviticus 20:13 repeats the prohibition, adding that both participants have committed an abomination and prescribing death as the punishment. Read in English, the wording seems fairly straightforward. In Hebrew, however, one expression has generated considerable disagreement among scholars.

The phrase is mishkevei ishah, which can be rendered literally as something like “the lyings of a woman.” Scholars disagree about precisely what the unusual plural describes. Some understand it as sexual intercourse performed in the manner associated with a woman, particularly anal intercourse between males. Others argue that it identifies a particular sexual role or refers to sexual relations associated with a woman, potentially limiting the prohibition to certain relationships.

The passage also uses the Hebrew word zakhar, meaning “male,” rather than a term specifically identifying an adult man. That doesn’t establish that the law concerned children, but the wording itself doesn’t specify the age or social relationship of the participants. Neither passage explicitly mentions rape, prostitution, pederasty, marriage, or incest. An interpretation that limits the law to one of those circumstances has to make its case from the language and context.

The two verses also differ in how they describe responsibility. Leviticus 18:22 addresses the person performing the prohibited action, while Leviticus 20:13 identifies both participants as having committed the offense. Scholars who argue that the law originally targeted only one sexual role have to account for that second formulation.

Sex and Masculinity in the Ancient World

We tend to approach ancient sexuality using modern categories. Today, homosexuality usually refers to sexual orientation, including attraction and the possibility of romantic relationships. The authors of Leviticus were not working with that understanding. In many ancient settings, sexual conduct was closely tied to social status, gender roles, family relationships, and power. The distinction between the person penetrating and the person being penetrated could carry considerable significance, particularly where receptive intercourse was associated with humiliation or a loss of masculine status.

These concerns appear in the Middle Assyrian Laws. Law A §19 addresses accusations concerning a man’s receptive sexual conduct, while §20 prescribes severe punishment for intercourse involving a male peer. The punishment includes retaliatory penetration and castration, which has led some scholars to interpret the provision as addressing rape or sexual aggression. That interpretation is possible, although the surviving wording doesn’t explicitly identify coercion as an element of the offense. The law’s concern with status, masculine honor, and sexual roles is much clearer.

Sexual omen texts from Mesopotamia discuss male-male intercourse in ways that don’t consistently resemble the prohibitions found in legal collections. The sources don’t give us one uniform ancient attitude, and there is no reason to assume that Israelite law simply adopted Assyrian assumptions. They do, however, help us understand how sexual conduct could be bound up with social meanings that don’t fit neatly into our categories.

Against this background, it is understandable that scholars have asked whether Leviticus was particularly concerned with domination or the violation of masculine expectations. Yet a society’s reason for condemning an act doesn’t necessarily tell us the full extent of its law. A culture might associate a sexual act with humiliation while prohibiting it even when humiliation wasn’t intended. The social background gives us possible explanations for the law; it doesn’t establish that rape or domination was its only concern.

Was the Prohibition About Rape?

One interpretation that has become increasingly common in popular discussions is that Leviticus concerned men sexually assaulting other men. Sexual violence could certainly function as a means of humiliation in the ancient world. Genesis 19 and Judges 19 both describe threatened sexual assaults involving male victims. Neither passage, however, explains the prohibition in Leviticus, and we can’t assume that every biblical reference to male-male intercourse concerns the same circumstances.

Leviticus itself doesn’t mention coercion. It doesn’t describe one participant as an aggressor and the other as a victim, and Leviticus 20:13 explicitly states that both participants have committed the offense. A reading that limits the prohibition exclusively to sexual assault has to explain that language.

Nor should we conclude from Leviticus 20:13 that a rape victim would necessarily have been punished. Deuteronomy 22:25–27 distinguishes a victim of sexual violence from the offender in a different legal setting, and later Jewish law developed broader principles concerning coercion and responsibility. The surviving sources don’t give us a ruling covering every possible circumstance involving a male rape victim under Leviticus 20:13. We can acknowledge that legal responsibility might depend on coercion without turning the entire prohibition into a law against rape. The wording does not support that restriction on its own.

What Scholars Disagree About

One of the more revealing debates concerns which participant the Hebrew is addressing. In 1994, Saul Olyan argued that the prohibition principally addresses the insertive participant in male anal intercourse. Jerome Walsh challenged that reading in 2001, arguing that the grammatical construction instead points toward the receptive participant. His reasoning centers on how mishkevei ishah functions with the verb “to lie.”

Olyan subsequently defended his interpretation, while George Hollenback’s 2017 examination favored Walsh’s reading. Their disagreement is about Hebrew grammar, not simply about how modern readers want to apply the law. Yet both readings have to account for Leviticus 20:13, which assigns responsibility to both participants.

Other scholars have proposed more substantial restrictions. Renato Lings argues that the prohibition should be understood within the chapter’s incest laws. Jan Joosten proposes that the unusual Hebrew wording restricts the prohibition to intercourse involving a married man, drawing attention to Genesis 49:4 and its reference to the bed of Reuben’s father. Bruce Wells offers another relational interpretation, arguing that the wording concerns males whose sexual relationships fall within a woman’s recognized domain, including married men and certain younger males under an adult woman’s legal authority.

These proposals deserve to be taken seriously because they are trying to explain an unusual expression in the Hebrew. Still, the incest reading doesn’t identify which male relative is prohibited, and the married-man reading has to account for the absence of any explicit reference to marriage. Wells likewise needs to establish that the original audience would have recognized his proposed relational restrictions in the wording itself. Those are real obstacles, even if they don’t end the debate.

Mark Preston Stone’s 2022 survey identifies at least twenty-one historical-critical proposals concerning these passages. They aren’t all equally persuasive, and the number of proposals doesn’t tell us which reading is right. It does show why the familiar English translation cannot simply be treated as the end of the discussion.

How Ancient Jews Understood the Law

The Greek translation of Leviticus in the Septuagint offers our next piece of evidence. It uses the terms arsēn, meaning “male,” and koitē, referring to a bed or sexual intercourse. It introduces no qualifications concerning rape, prostitution, pederasty, or incest, though it preserves much of the unusual structure of the Hebrew. The translation therefore leaves some of the same questions open.

Philo of Alexandria, a Jewish philosopher writing during the first century AD, gives us a more explicit interpretation. He read Jewish Scripture in a world heavily influenced by Greek philosophy, and his discussions of sexual conduct draw on ideas about nature, reproduction, and masculinity. In On the Special Laws 3.37–42, he condemns conduct involving males that he regards as contrary to nature, paying particular attention to pederasty and effeminacy. His criticism reflects assumptions about masculinity and the proper use of the body that were common in his intellectual environment.

In section 39, Philo connects his condemnation of pederasty to the failure to use sexual capacity for reproduction. His categories are far removed from a modern discussion of sexual orientation, and we should read them in their own setting. Even so, his objection extends beyond coercion: he condemns sexual practices that he believes violate the natural order.

In On Abraham 135–136, Philo discusses the men of Sodom and describes male-male desire and intercourse as violations of nature. Whatever we make of his reasoning, the condemnation is broader than a narrowly defined act of sexual assault.

Josephus, writing near the end of the first century AD, describes Jewish sexual law in Against Apion 2.199–201. He connects legitimate intercourse with marriage between a man and a woman and with reproduction, while explicitly condemning intercourse between males in section 199. He then turns to marriage arrangements, sexual force, and adultery. For Josephus, intercourse between males is a category of prohibited conduct in its own right, not simply another name for rape.

Both writers lived centuries after the Levitical laws developed, and both interpreted Jewish traditions within a Greco-Roman intellectual environment. We can’t use them to establish every detail of the original authors’ intentions. We can say, however, that influential Jewish writers in the first century AD understood the prohibition broadly, without the narrow restrictions proposed by some modern scholars. That understanding did not originate in later Christian sexual theology.

The Rabbis and the Development of Jewish Law

The rabbinic literature takes us further into the development of Jewish law. The Mishnah, compiled around 200 AD, includes male-male intercourse among the offenses associated with the biblical punishment of stoning (Sanhedrin 7:4). This is a legal classification, not evidence that such executions were routinely carried out. It does show that the conduct was treated as a recognizable category of prohibited sexual activity.

The Sifra, a rabbinic commentary on Leviticus, discusses forbidden sexual customs as well. In its interpretation of Leviticus 18:3, it includes men marrying men and women marrying women among practices attributed to Egypt and Canaan (Sifra, Acharei Mot 8:8). The passage is not a direct explanation of Leviticus 18:22, nor is it evidence that such marriages were widespread historical practices in Egypt. Instead, it does show that rabbinic sexual ethics could address relationships and marriage arrangements as well as particular sexual acts.

The Babylonian Talmud examines the Hebrew wording more closely. In Sanhedrin 54a, the rabbis interpret the plural expression mishkevei ishah as establishing that both vaginal and anal intercourse can constitute prohibited intercourse with a woman who is forbidden to a man. This tells us how the phrase functioned within rabbinic legal reasoning, although we can’t assume that the original author of Leviticus necessarily understood it in precisely the same way. The rabbis were working within an established legal tradition, and their conclusions tell us about that tradition as much as they tell us about the ancient wording.

The same discussion considers distinctions involving adults and minors, including the age at which particular acts meet the legal definition of intercourse. These are technical legal questions about conduct and liability, not modern discussions of consent. The rabbis were trying to define the prohibited conduct and determine how responsibility should be assigned.

In Sanhedrin 54b, Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree about how Scripture establishes the prohibition for the receptive participant. Rabbi Ishmael derives the warning from Deuteronomy 23:18, supported by a passage in 1 Kings, while Rabbi Akiva derives it from an alternative reading of Leviticus 18:22. Neither rabbi argues that the receptive participant was permitted to engage in the act. Their disagreement concerns the scriptural basis for the prohibition.

The discussions also required the rabbis to consider age, sexual roles, and responsibility. Jewish legal traditions recognized coercion as relevant to culpability, though that general principle doesn’t tell us how every possible circumstance under Leviticus 20:13 would have been resolved. What we find in the rabbinic literature is a developing legal interpretation: male-male intercourse was generally treated as prohibited, even as the rabbis debated how to derive the law from Scripture and apply it to particular cases.

What About Paul?

Paul was writing within this Jewish tradition, although he addressed different audiences and questions. In Romans 1:26–27, he condemns same-sex conduct through an argument involving nature and the perceived disordering of sexual relations. His reasoning resembles aspects of the Jewish-Hellenistic moral framework reflected in Philo, particularly the emphasis on conduct understood as contrary to nature.

In 1 Corinthians 6:9 and 1 Timothy 1:10, we encounter the Greek term arsenokoitai. Many scholars connect it to the Septuagint’s wording of Leviticus, particularly its combination of words associated with males and sexual intercourse. The precise meaning and scope of the compound remain debated, and translating it simply as “homosexual” imports a modern category into an ancient text. Restricting it to exploitation alone, however, also requires an argument from the surviving evidence. Paul inherited Jewish scriptural and moral traditions that already contained broad condemnations of male-male intercourse, although the specific questions raised by his vocabulary deserve separate treatment.

What Can We Actually Conclude?

Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 concern male-male sexual intercourse, most plausibly penetrative intercourse. Scholars have raised legitimate questions about the unusual Hebrew wording, the sexual roles involved, and whether certain relationships were originally in view. Those questions deserve serious consideration. But neither passage explicitly identifies rape, pederasty, prostitution, or exploitation as the exclusive object of the prohibition, and the cultural background alone does not supply that limitation.

By the first century AD, Philo and Josephus were interpreting the prohibition broadly. Later rabbis continued to treat male-male intercourse as prohibited while debating the scriptural basis for the law and the circumstances affecting liability. None of this proves that the first audience of Leviticus understood every detail in the same way. It does, however, make a rape-only or exploitation-only reading difficult to sustain without additional evidence. And it shows that broad Jewish interpretations of these verses were already in circulation long before later Christian debates about sexuality.

How Christians should apply these ancient laws today remains a separate theological and ethical question. The authors of Leviticus were not describing sexual orientation in the modern sense, and that gap in categories has to be acknowledged. But if the historical claim is that these verses originally prohibited only rape or exploitation, neither the wording of the law nor its early Jewish reception gives us sufficient reason to say so.

Sources and Further Reading

Primary Sources

Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13.

Genesis 49:4.

Deuteronomy 22:25–27.

Septuagint, Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13.

Philo, On the Special Laws 3.37–42; On Abraham 135–136.

Josephus, Against Apion 2.199–201.

Mishnah, Sanhedrin 7:4.

Sifra, Acharei Mot 8:8.

Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 54a–55a.

Middle Assyrian Laws A §§19–20, translated in Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 2nd ed. (1997).

Modern Scholarship

Saul M. Olyan, “‘And with a Male You Shall Not Lie the Lying Down of a Woman’: On the Meaning and Significance of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 5, no. 2 (1994): 179–206.

Jerome T. Walsh, “Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13: Who Is Doing What to Whom?” Journal of Biblical Literature 120, no. 2 (2001): 201–209.

George M. Hollenback, “Who Is Doing What to Whom Revisited: Another Look at Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13,” Journal of Biblical Literature 136, no. 3 (2017): 529–537.

Renato Lings, “The ‘Lyings’ of a Woman: Male-Male Incest in Leviticus 18.22?” Theology & Sexuality 15, no. 2 (2009): 231–250.

Jan Joosten, “A New Interpretation of Leviticus 18:22 (Par. 20:13) and its Ethical Implications,” Journal of Theological Studies 71, no. 1 (2020): 1–10.

Bruce Wells, “On the Beds of a Woman: The Leviticus Texts on Same-Sex Relations Reconsidered,” in Sexuality and Law in the Torah (2020), 123–158.

Mark Preston Stone, “Don’t Do What to Whom? A Survey of Historical-Critical Scholarship on Leviticus 18.22 and 20.13,” Currents in Biblical Research 20, no. 3 (2022): 207–237.

Eve Levavi Feinstein, Sexual Pollution in the Hebrew Bible (2014).

William Loader, The New Testament on Sexuality (2012).

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