The Death of Substance? Quantum Physics, Being, and God
Science Lectures
A rock seems like a straightforward example of something that exists. It has a shape, occupies space, and remains recognizably the same rock even as it weathers. For much of Western philosophy, questions like these led to the idea of substance: something that persists through change and helps explain why a thing is what it is. The concept eventually became important to Christian theology, including the language used to describe the Trinity.
Twentieth-century physics complicated the picture. Relativity changed how physicists understood space and time, while quantum theory exposed behavior that no ordinary picture of solid, independently existing particles could adequately describe. Some theologians, including Ernest Simmons and John Polkinghorne, have argued that these developments invite us to think more seriously about relationships as part of the structure of reality. Simmons goes further, using quantum entanglement as a metaphor for the Trinity and God's relationship with creation.
Physics clearly changed our picture of matter. How much those changes tell us about substance as Aristotle and later theologians understood it is another question.
The Rise and Reign of Substance
Long before quantum physics, Greek philosophers were asking how we can know anything in a world where everything appears to change. Plato distinguished the changing things we encounter through our senses from the more stable Forms that make them intelligible. His allegory of the cave in Republic imagines prisoners who mistake shadows for the things casting them. The story illustrates the limits of ordinary perception, although Plato's theory of Forms went considerably further.
Aristotle took a different approach. The form of a horse, for example, was not something that existed separately in another realm. It belonged to the horse itself. He called particular things, including individual people and animals, primary substances. Their features could change without making them entirely different things. A horse might grow, become injured, or change color and still remain the same animal. Aristotle distinguished substance from accidents, characteristics that belong to a thing without defining what kind of thing it is. His broader account of matter and form was intended to explain both continuity and genuine change.
That is already more complicated than the familiar image of a hard, unchanging lump hidden inside every object. Aristotle was trying to explain how things endure while changing. Later Aristotelian thinkers also spoke of prime matter, a theoretical account of what underlies substantial change. It was a metaphysical proposal, not a particle that anyone expected to uncover beneath an atom.
Christian theologians borrowed Greek philosophical language because they faced questions for which ordinary speech was inadequate. At Nicaea in 325 AD, the Son was confessed as homoousios with the Father, meaning of the same essence or substance. Fourth-century Cappadocian theologians helped clarify the distinction between one divine ousia and three hypostaseis, usually rendered in English as essence and persons. These terms were meant to hold together the unity of God and the real distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit.
Thomas Aquinas later worked extensively with Aristotelian philosophy, but he did not describe the Trinity as one impersonal substance appearing in three modes. That would be uncomfortably close to the modalism classical Trinitarian theology rejected. Aquinas wrote of the divine persons as subsisting relations: the Father is distinguished by relation to the Son, the Son by relation to the Father, and so on. Substance and relation were already involved in the same theological account. In the seventeenth century, Descartes likewise made substance central to his philosophy, although his strict definition of something existing without dependence applied fully to God alone. Created minds and bodies still depended on God for their existence.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, substance had acquired several meanings across philosophy, theology, and natural science. Treating all of them as one doctrine makes the coming scientific developments look far more decisive than they actually were.
What Physics Actually Changed
Classical mechanics had encouraged a picture of bodies moving through an independently existing space and a universal time. Einstein's special relativity in 1905 challenged the assumption that all observers share the same measurements of space and time. General relativity, completed a decade later, described gravity through the geometry of spacetime, which is related to the distribution of matter and energy. Space and time could no longer be treated as the fixed stage on which an otherwise unchanged physical drama unfolded.
Quantum theory presented a different difficulty. From Max Planck's work on energy in 1900 through the quantum mechanics developed by Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Born, and others in the 1920s, physicists found that atomic behavior resisted the familiar model of particles possessing a complete set of ordinary, definite properties at every moment. Quantum states allow superpositions, and the theory predicts probabilities for the outcomes of measurements. Heisenberg's uncertainty relations place limits on how sharply certain pairs of quantities, such as position and momentum, can be specified together. The uncertainty is a fundamental feature of quantum mechanics, present even under ideal experimental conditions.
What a quantum state tells us about physical reality remains disputed. Some interpretations include a genuine collapse of the state in measurement; others do not. The agreement on experimental predictions conceals substantial disagreement over what exists between measurements. Treating that disagreement as proof that enduring substances have disappeared would be premature.
Quantum field theory later supplied another unfamiliar picture. In this framework, what we call a particle can be described as an excitation of a quantum field. The old image of a miniature billiard ball is a poor guide to such a particle, although the field description leaves the philosophical questions open. Electrons, for example, are stable. Physicists still speak meaningfully of identifiable systems, properties, and physical entities, even while disagreeing about the best interpretation of the mathematics.
Why Relationship Became So Appealing
Ernest Simmons takes the stronger position in The Entangled Trinity. Discussing twentieth-century physics, he declares, "Substantive ontology was dead, and relational ontology was born" (p. 36). For Simmons, relationships, processes, and change are constitutive of reality. His account owes a great deal to Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy, alongside the physics that prompted the argument.
Simmons offers an ordinary example. Ask someone to introduce themselves, and much of the answer will be relational: their family, where they grew up, the community to which they belong, their work, and the people who helped shape them. We do not understand a person very well by listing physical characteristics in isolation. The relationships are part of the person's history and identity, and losing some of them can genuinely change a life.
The example is persuasive about human identity. The step from how we describe ourselves to what fundamentally exists requires more argument. A person may be profoundly shaped by relationships while remaining someone who has those relationships. Simmons's larger claim depends on accepting his philosophical account of the person.
Quantum entanglement supplies a more technical example of why relationships cannot always be treated as incidental. In an entangled system, correlations between measurement results can exceed what certain local hidden-variable models permit. Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen famously challenged the implications of quantum theory in 1935; Schrödinger helped develop the concept of entanglement that same year. John Bell's later theorem made the issue experimentally testable, and experiments by John Clauser, Alain Aspect, Anton Zeilinger, and others established violations of Bell inequalities.
It is tempting to imagine one particle sending an instantaneous message to another. Quantum theory predicts the correlations without providing a way to use them for faster-than-light communication. The joint state has properties that a description of wholly independent parts misses, although physicists still debate what that tells us about reality. John Polkinghorne found this relational character suggestive. In Science and the Trinity, he considered it alongside the interconnectedness of natural systems and the unpredictability of some physical processes in a wider conversation between science and theology.
Reconsidering the Trinity
Simmons's comparison draws on a difficulty that Christian theologians had faced for centuries. Christianity confesses one God in three persons, and its early theologians struggled to explain how Father, Son, and Spirit could be genuinely distinct without dividing God into three gods. They were equally concerned to avoid reducing the three persons to names for a single divine figure appearing in different ways.
The Cappadocians gave considerable attention to the distinctions among the persons, and Augustine and Aquinas also treated relations as central to Trinitarian theology. Later theologians developed the language of perichoresis, or mutual indwelling, to describe the inseparability of the divine persons without confusing them. John of Damascus gave this language a particularly influential formulation in the eighth century.
Simmons draws on this history when he compares perichoresis to quantum entanglement. An entangled system cannot always be understood by describing each part independently, even though the parts can be distinguished. He sees in this a comparison with a Trinity whose persons are distinct yet inseparable. Simmons presents the connection as a theological metaphor, one that may appeal to readers accustomed to picturing three separate individuals somehow adding up to one.
The analogy has limits that become clear once we look at what entanglement describes. Its mathematical states, interactions, and measurable correlations concern physical systems within the universe. The doctrine of the Trinity concerns God, whose persons are not particles and whose unity is not the sort of correlation measured in a laboratory.
Polkinghorne takes a somewhat broader route in Science and the Trinity. He considers seven features of the scientifically described universe alongside Trinitarian theology, including the intelligibility of nature, its evolutionary history, the relational character of physical systems, and the limits of what our ordinary intuitions can grasp (pp. 61–86). He asks whether these features are consonant with belief in a God understood through the Father, Son, and Spirit. Polkinghorne is explicit that he is not deriving the Trinity from the scientific features themselves.
Christians have long tried to understand creation in light of their beliefs about its creator, and new scientific discoveries may challenge inherited assumptions about nature. The difficulty for Polkinghorne's approach is how much weight consonance can bear. Someone working from a different theological tradition, or from a nonreligious philosophy, might find the same scientific discoveries compatible with another account. A specifically Trinitarian conclusion would require further reasons to favor that interpretation.
Beyond the Trinity
Simmons's proposal reaches beyond the Trinity to God's relationship with creation. His panentheistic approach understands the world as existing in God while maintaining that God exceeds the world. He connects this with the idea of continuing creation, creatio continua, and a picture of divine life that is intimately involved with a changing universe. The language can sound familiar to Christians who understand God as sustaining the world, although classical theists have also defended continuing creation without adopting panentheism. More controversially, a strong relational ontology may imply that God's relationship with the world helps constitute God's own life. Traditional theologians who emphasize divine independence will object that creation is free and contingent; God does not need a world in order to be God.
The discussion also has consequences for how we think about human beings. Family, language, community, and history shape who we become. Christian language about the Body of Christ has long treated human lives as bound to one another, and biology and social history supply plenty of examples of that dependence. The picture of people as isolated individuals who owe nothing to anyone else is difficult to defend on those grounds alone.
Polkinghorne also considered whether the openness and complexity of physical processes might provide a way to think about divine action. His proposal involving active information imagines God acting through patterns and possibilities within nature, without the picture of an occasional interruption from outside. On page 83 of Science and the Trinity, he explicitly treats the idea as conjectural and acknowledges that it needs further development. How such divine action could be distinguished from the ordinary unfolding of physical processes remains unresolved.
Calling this the death of substance makes a good headline. As a conclusion, it is much harder to defend. Aristotle's account of a thing persisting through change, the theological language of divine essence, and the mechanical picture of particles are different claims. Relativity and quantum mechanics transformed the last of those pictures without producing a general verdict on the first two.
Simmons makes the bolder metaphysical move, drawing on Whitehead to treat relations as constitutive of reality. Polkinghorne is more tentative and asks whether the world described by science is consonant with Trinitarian belief. Their proposals differ in scope and confidence, yet both return us to a theological problem that was already old when modern physics began. Augustine admitted in On the Trinity (V.9) that Christians spoke of three persons partly because silence was not much of an answer to the question before them.